IV. The Irrevocable, Overwhelming and Infinite Iranization of Islam in Asia and Europe, and the Attempt of Unification of Christianity and Islam
The defeat, debacle and decomposition of the Sassanid Empire of Iran did not occur under the calamitous circumstances that Western colonial historians tend to describe for political reasons. When a modern scholar accepts uncritically the enthusiasm of the early militants of a cause that some historical sources may preserve (and some modern idiotic Islamists take as a life model), he certainly is not an academic but a biased extremist.
Although Sassanid Iran was exsanguine after four centuries of wars with the Roman and later the Eastern Roman Empire (which had also reached its limits), it took 15 years (636-651), three major battles (at Qadissiyyah / 636, Nahavand / 642, and Merv / 651), and many disputes around the throne of Istakhr (notably due to Mahoe Suri) for Yazdegerd III to fall, before Chinese assistance arrived. It is however important to discern that the invading armies did not destroy centers of Mazdaean faith and monotheistic cult, but imperial sites. The holiest Sassanid shrine, namely Takht-e Suleyman (Praaspa or Adhur Gushnasp) in Northern Zagros, was not destroyed, but remained intact.
If we take into account the fact that the Aramaeans, who constituted a significant component of the population of the Sassanid empire, rejoiced with the arrival of the early Islamic armies because for more than 300 years the Christians (: the Nestorians) had been persecuted in Iran, whereas the new faith was perceived at the time as merely a Nestorian variant, and if we also pay attention at the division between the Persian and the Parthian nobilities of the empire, we can conclude that the fall of the Sassanid Empire to the Islamic armies was a far more nuanced development.
Even more so, because several mountainous regions remained totally out of the early Caliphate control; there, the local dynasties continued reigning in the name of Ahura Mazda. Quite interestingly, it is from these regions (notably Daylam and Gilan, i.e. the southern coastlands of the Caspian Sea, and the mountains of South Azerbaijan) and with the help of the local dynasties that numerous anti-Omayyad and anti-Abbasid rebellious movements surged and expanded, challenging the thrones of Damascus first and Baghdad later.
Only 130 years after the battle of Merv, the Aramaean Nestorian monk Subhanalisho (lit. "Glory to Jesus") and his team were dispatched by the Nestorian Patriarch in Baghdad (then recently transferred there from Mahoze (Tesifun/Ctesiphon) to Daylam to evangelize the Mazdeists of the region. And only 2-3 decades later, in the early 9th c., the Mazdaean standard bearer and Commander Babak Khorramdin and his rebels, the Khurramites, shook the Caliphate from its foundations, keeping the Abbasid caliphs Al Ma'mun and Al Mu'tasim busy for no less than 20 years. Thus, although post-Sassanid Mazdeists, they became the spiritual ancestors of many Islamic schools (tariqas) of spirituality, mysticism and transcendence, notably the Qizilbash and the Bektashis. The interconnection of the Iranian and Islamic worlds starts therefore at the spiritual level first.
What today's biased scholars of the Western universities and ignorant pseudo-Muslim theologians of the religious establishments do not want to see (let alone admit) is something that the Persians, the Aramaeans, the Turanians and all the other Iranian nations were able to observe, comprehend and evaluate back at those days. While Iran was being defeated, i.e. during the period 636-651 and soon afterwards, two crystal clear facts were easily noticeable by all the surviving Iranian elites:
a- with respect to the wars between the early Muslims and the Eastern Roman Empire, it was evident that it was not properly speaking a conflict between two opposite armies fighting for two opposite religions, but an overwhelming clash between Western Aramaean Jacobites, Copts, and Monophysitic / Miaphysitic Christians in general and the Constantinopolitan Orthodoxy of the Eastern Roman Empire; this was particularly revealed in the so-called Battle of the Masts (Ma'rakat dhat al Sawari / معركة ذات الصواري), the naval battle that took place in 654-655. There were so few Muslim fighters that the historic sea battle should rather be described as a Christian sectarian war.
b- concerning the Arab followers of the new religion, it was evident to all that they were deeply divided among them.
From one side, ravenous barbarians, agitated for fights and pillaging, accepted the heretic and profane calls of Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar ibn al Khattab (634-644), and Uthman ibn Affan (644-656) for razzias, battles and invasions to supposedly diffuse and impose their faith, and in the process, they betrayed the preaching of Prophet Muhammad that took place at Ghadir Khumm (on the 16th March 632, i.e. only three months before his death), when he called for a peaceful spread of Islam. These evil and greedy plunderers, under the guidance of Prophet Muhammad's worst enemy, Abu Sufyan, coordinated with the Monophysitic (Jacobite) Aramaeans of Damascus against the Eastern Roman armies and with the Nestorian Aramaeans of Tesifun (Ctesiphon) against the Sassanid Iranian armies.
From the other side, the followers (or party) of Ali (known as "shi'at'ul Ali" /شيعة علي) did not participate in the attacks, skirmishes or invasions. Even more notably, during the tenure of Ali ibn Abi Taleb (656-660), not a single war was undertaken against surrounding states.
The polarity between the two groups of early Muslims was enormous; their clash took an extremely brutal form involving all sorts of heinous, criminal and monstrous acts carried out by the barbarian garrisons of the first three caliphs. The evil character of the caliphs of Medina, the bestial behavior of most of the Umayyad caliphs, and the persecution that the offspring of Ali (Ahl al Bayt) underwent generated a great part of sympathy for them among many Iranians. The transfer of the capital from Medina to Kufa (South Mesopotamia) by Ali (657) dragged many Iranians to Ali's side and certainly contributed to the gradual adoption of Ali's faith by numerous Iranians. Another major factor of attraction of many Iranians to the new religion was the presence of Iranians among the companions of Prophet Muhammad, like Salman al Farsi (سلمان الفارسي), who sided with Ali ibn Abi Taleb, translated the Quran to Farsi (or Middle Persian?), and was appointed as first Muslim governor of Tesifun / Ctesiphon after the Islamic invasion.
Later on, professional fighters from among the Turanian populations of the fallen Sassanid empire and Turanian soldiers from Turan (Central Asia), who wanted to make a military career in the new empire under formation, contributed greatly to the success of the Abbasid revolution and the substitution of the Umayyad dynasty by the Abbasids. When a new capital was erected in Baghdad, it became certain that Iran would soon make a spectacular comeback. And this is what happened.
A. The Barmakids and Bayt al Hikmah: the incorporation of all scientific, academic and intellectual schools and traditions into a unified, universal, original, and exemplar house of sciences
In fact, in the middle of the 8th c.,
a) the prevalence of the Abbasids (with the decisive contribution of Turanian soldiers and Iranian populations),
b) the foundation of the new capital at Baghdad,
c) the subordination of Eastern Anatolia, South Caucasus, Syria, Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt to the imperial center in Mesopotamia, and
d) the further expansion of the empire that stretched from India to NW Africa and from Central Asia to the Horn of Africa…
… were viewed -by many noble, well-educated, and farseeing Iranians, either Zoroastrians or Muslims- as highly beneficial and auspicious developments.
They could only herald the following cardinal realities and potentialities:
a- the reunification of the long divided western provinces of Iran with the Iranian mainland was achieved;
b- the material reconstitution of the Achaemenid Empire was therefore a fact;
c- the establishment of the universal-ecumenical-imperial order was attainable; and
d- the prevalence of the divine nature and culture of Iran over Aniran was within reach.
It was consequently clear that all they had to do was to accommodate the essence, the principles, and structure of Prophet Muhammad's faith and Ali ibn Abu Taleb's preaching within the riparian lands of Iranian spirituality, wisdom and science, also dragging Chinese, Turanians, Indians, and Eastern Romans into it. Actually as per the beliefs of the newly arrived rulers, Zoroaster, the founder of their own religion, civilization and ancient empire, could be easily, yet comprehensively, considered as a fully accredited Islamic Prophet.
Only 140 years after the Sassanid invasion of Egypt, the Nile Valley was again part of an empire with capital in Mesopotamia. The Sassanid armies, which were defeated in 628 by Heraclius, have mysteriously, providentially, and conclusively achieved to win a posthumous, irrevocable victory one and half century later. For many noble Iranian families and the offspring of Sassanid administrators and magistrates of the early 7th c., the new diffused religion had indeed an appearance of similarity with Zoroastrianism. Contrarily to Christianity, which had complex and lengthy cultic procedures, enormous ritualistic processes, and religious festivals, which functioned as theatrical representations or sacred narratives, Islam had a minimal part of cult and a greater part of spirituality, mysticism, moral and meditation. In spite of the evident thematic continuity from the Ancient Hebrew religion and Achaemenid times' Judaism, Christianity as religion was closer to Mithraism, whereas Islam was quite equivalent to the faith preached by Zoroaster.
The conclusion as to what to do was easy for them to take; by accepting the newly preached religion and by offering to the primitive, uneducated, and unsophisticated Abbasid rulers their own Iranian administrative know-how, scientific knowledge, intellectual refinement, artistic and architectural skills, socio-behavioral and cultural background, educational talent, academic systematization, spiritual wisdom, and imperial tradition, they would make of the newly risen Arab family the device of their universalist-ecumenical ambitions. What would then be at stake would define World History.
By canceling the negative effects of the (falsely believed as 'Islamic' but truly anti-Islamic) early invasions (undertaken by the greedy and fanatic soldiers of Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al Khattab, and Uthman ibn Affan), they would irreversibly change the 'Error of History' (namely the collapse of the Sassanid Empire of Iran) and transform the events in a most dexterous manner as if Prophet Muhammad's letter dispatched to Khusraw (Chosroes) II was accepted by the Shah and even more so as if Prophet Muhammad himself had been invited at the imperial capital at Tesifun (Ctesiphon) and his preaching had been then accepted there like that of Prophet Yunus (Jonah) at Nineveh, almost 14 centuries earlier.
This pledge was done, the endeavor was materialized, and History totally changed. Thanks to the Barmakid family, Iranian civilization made its way to Baghdad. The hitherto primitive administration of the Caliphate took quite promptly the allure of imperial governance. Despite the early efforts deployed by the Umayyads to set up a state similar to that of the Eastern Roman Empire and notwithstanding the obvious attempts made by Abd el Malik ibn Marwan (647-705; caliph after 685) at the end of the 7th c. (involving numerous Aramaeans and Eastern Romans in the conduct of government), it is only around the year 800 that an Islamic empire reached a level of parity with the Constantinopolitan 'kratos' (state).
The Barmakid family became first known to the Umayyad Court at Damascus as the career of Khalid ibn Barmak (709-782) demonstrates, but their association with the descendants of Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (uncle of Prophet Muhammad) brought cataclysmic changes in World History. Bringing indomitable Turanian soldiers to the army of Abu al-'Abbas (who became known as first Abbasid caliph under the name al-Saffah) and starting the revolution at Khorasan, only few years after the rebellions undertaken by Zayd ibn Ali (great grandson of Ali ibn Abi Taleb) were suppressed (736 and 740), the Barmakids generated a situation in which the old tribal milieu of the Meccan Muslims could not anymore survive.
The stupendous interaction of the two families, Abbasids and Barmakids, reached the level of Yahya ibn Khalid (Khalid ibn Barmak's son) being entrusted with both, the administration of the 'Emirate of Armenia' (إمارة أرمينية /Imarat Arminiya; the Caliphate's northwestern province) and the mentoring of the future caliph Harun al Rashid whose education was therefore entirely Iranian and not Arab. The tribal filth of Hejaz, which had caused so many troubles to Prophet Muhammad and had shed the blood of Ali ibn Abi Taleb's family so many times, was almost dead.
As it could be expected, a great number of Iranian institutions were swiftly revived and radiated again. Whereas only 150 years before the rise of the Abbasids, writing in Mecca was scarce, papyri and parchments were scanty, and literate people were few, Farhangestan-e Gondeshapur - the Sassanid Imperial center of science, learning, knowledge, exploration and wisdom was the then world's most advanced research center, university, library, hospital, translation center, and archiving repository. The Iranian scientific school constituted the unparalleled heritage of the world's earliest civilizations, cultures and sciences.
In an effort to promote the new dynasty's potential and expand the Caliphate's horizons, the Barmakids made the Abbasids realize that imperial power, dynastic constancy, and worldwide radiation did not hinge on strictly formulated theology and erroneously perceived religion but on faith-based science, accurate information, and systematic exploration of the universe; these endeavors would be prerequisites for spiritual comprehension and moral wisdom. A truthful science is beneficial to all humans, Muslims or not, because Truth (Al Haq in Arabic) "is" God (Allah), according to Islam.
Trying to ostracize sins, theologians multiply them among their followers, whereas tolerating transgression, mystics allow their disciples to take the path of repentance.
Starting with private imperial collections of books, manuscripts, and scientific tools, the founders of the illustrious Bayt al Hikmah effectively revived and further expanded Gundishapur, drawing people and material from other great Iranian centers of learning, notably Tesifun/Ctesiphon, Neyshapur, Merv, and Balkh (Bactra), from the distinguished Aramaean Schools of Urhoy (Edessa of Osrhoene / Urfa), Nisibis (Nusaybin), and Antioch (Antakya), from libraries and learning centers in Egypt, Yemen, India, Armenia, the conquered province of the Eastern Roman Empire, and last but not the least, China.
The overall vision was outstanding, groundbreaking, and unprecedented; Bayt al Hikmah was predestined to use the Islamic faith and spirituality, as preached by Prophet Muhammad and practiced by Ali ibn Abi Taleb, in order to incorporate all scientific, academic, intellectual and spiritual schools and traditions into a unified, universal, original, and exemplar house of sciences. And this generated the miracle of the first universal scholarly center of spiritual and material sciences that lasted for almost five (5) centuries (from 170 AH/786 CE to 656 AH/1258 CE).
B. Modern Western Misrepresentation and Distortion of the Golden Age of Islam that remains undisputed by today's Muslims
With respect to the historic function of Bayt al Hikmah several pseudo-academic lies, intellectual myths, colonial forgeries, and absurd, racist distortion of History have been invented and propagated by Western universities and academies in order to promote the sickness of Westernization, which -as mental, socio-behavioral, and cultural contamination- is at the origin of all the problems of our world. This issue should be a priority for all Muslims, Eastern and Oriental Christians, Jews, Africans, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists and Confucians to denounce.
Comprehensive decolonization and de-Westernization is far more important, crucial and effective than warring against a tiny outpost of the Western colonials. But the failed since 1979 regime of the Ayatollahs never managed to understand this fact, thus becoming the tool of some Westerners against other Westerners.
Denouncing the academic myths, deliberate omissions, and absurd fallacies is not the purpose of the present article, which is written in order to feature the far-reaching impact and radiation of Iran and to highlight its position as the central nation of World History. However, I will now briefly enumerate several misconceptions that were spread by Western scholarship as regards the Bayt al Hikmah and the Golden Age of Islamic civilization that it engendered.
1. There was no "Islamic Philosophy"; there was "Islamic Wisdom".
A serious case of misrepresentation of the Islamic civilization and of one of its pillars is the discussion about "philosophy" and "philosophers". This is a fraudulent transfer of external, alien, and derogatory terms and 'values' within the context of the Islamic world. There is no such thing as "Islamic philosophy", and there were never Muslim philosophers; and for a very good reason: because within the far wider context of Oriental civilization where the Islamic phenomenon can be contextualized, there was never philosophy but "Wisdom". The term "Hikmah" is the main word used (in Farsi, Arabic and Turkic texts dating back to the Golden Age of Islam) in order to designate the erudition that transcends knowledge and the comprehension that translates to righteous spiritual-material synergy.
Compared to Wisdom, 'philosophy' is nonsensical arguing and worthless talk about divine affairs which are thus only verbally discussed, but never spiritually sensed, fully assessed or actively performed. Whereas Oriental Wisdom constitutes the sole bridge between the spiritual and the material worlds, 'philosophy' is an ineffective and useless conversation among the non-Initiates, i.e. the profane and barbarous elites who wished to mitigate their filthy material interests with intellectual vanity, social pride, and personal self-deception; in other words, philosophy is a sacrilege.
Actually, never did a philosopher reach the level of a high priest acting divinely and performing 'miracles', i.e. natural results of spiritual-material synergy; and reversely those, who attended the morose discourses of philosophers talking about what they did not know, never attained the piety, the chastity, and the illumination of a priestly initiate. For this reason, the Ancient Ionian philosophers, who coined the novel term 'philosophy', knowing very well their inferiority opposite their Assyrian, Babylonian, Iranian, and Egyptian tutors, who were Oriental high priests, described themselves (not as 'wise men' but) as 'friends of the wisdom' (: philosophers) and their activity (not as 'wisdom' but) as 'friendliness to wisdom' (: philosophy); they acknowledged that Wisdom was too high for them to ever acquire.
In the Islamic world, due to the minimal part of dogma and cult that the Islamic religion has, there were no priestly initiates but numerous mystics and their schools (tariqas); and between them and the Muslim scientists stood the wise elders, who were comfortable in ruminating, meditating and comprehending at both levels, spiritual and material. There was certainly references to few Ancient Ionian (: not 'Greek'; the term 'Yunani' means 'Ionian') philosophers in Islamic texts of wisdom and transcendental erudition; but it was basically marginal, at times due to the need for refutation and often owed to the desire to eventually dissent and/or to oppose and criticize the fanatic and absurd theological attempts to put Islamic Wisdom under purposeless and nonsensical doctrinal scrutiny.
In the desire of several Muslim erudite scholars to translate, study, mention, and also comment on Ancient Ionian philosophical texts there was an apparent religious-theological reason. They acted so, because the Fathers of the Christian Church had already worked accordingly in their effort to drastically eliminate the roots of the evil, effectively refute the myths and the lies diffused by most of those philosophers, and eventually extract -from the philosophical dialogues and treatises that were preserved until their times- the scarce correct elements. In other words, the Muslim wise elders wanted to demonstrate that there was an active affinity in terms of culture, civilization, and world conceptualization in spite of the diverse dogmatic contradictions and polarizations between Christianity and Islam.
Now, the reason for which the malignant and perverse colonial gangsters of the Western universities and academies promote and propagate worldwide the use of the viciously false term "Islamic Philosophy" is simple; they intend to totally distort the essence of the Islamic civilization and to portray it as
- insignificant paraphernalia of the otherwise nonexistent Greco-Roman civilization (which is a malicious construct),
- marginal offspring of the Judeo-Christian world (which constitutes an enormous fallacy),
- totally unrelated to the Ancient Oriental civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Anatolia, Canaan and Iran, which constitute the unsurpassed start of mankind and the irrevocable riparian land of World History, and
- fully dissociated from the diverse civilizations of China, Northern and Central Asia, India, Africa, and Eastern Europe that the most outstanding Muslim erudite scholars of the Golden Age of Islam intended and attempted to integrate in a universal system of undivided, spiritual and material, sciences from the 9th to the 15th c..
2. A certain "Greco-Arabic translation movement" in the Islamic World is a factoid
Another academic myth, generated due to the malignant intentions of the Western colonial Orientalists and for exactly the aforementioned purposes, is the notorious yet nonexistent "Greco-Arabic translation movement". Translation endeavors are inherently Oriental and typically scarce in the uncivilized West; the magnitude of the undertaking was apparently felt and fully revered throughout the Orient across the ages.
Mesopotamia constituted a multilingual world since the 4th millennium BCE. From the 2nd millennium BCE translators of Hattusha (the Hittite imperial capital), Ugarit (the foremost Canaanite kingdom), and Akhetaten (Tell Amarna; the new Egyptian capital established by the monotheist Pharaoh Akhenaten, the founder of Atenism, the first monotheism in World History) to their respective colleagues of the 1st millennium BCE in Nineveh, Kalhu, Assyria, Tushpa (Van in Eastern Turkey, the capital of Urartu kingdom), Babylon, Parsa (Persepolis), Susa, etc., a time-honored tradition of translation and multilingualism set the foundations of the Achaemenid multicultural empire that united the lands between the Adriatic Sea and China, becoming known for its trilingual inscriptions (in Old Achaemenid, Neo-Babylonian and Neo-Elamite).
Akkadian (: Assyrian-Babylonian) was World History's first international language in which the Hittite Emperor's and the Egyptian Pharaoh's scribes excelled to ensure accurate communication between their masters. Later, the Aramaic alphabet replaced the Achaemenid cuneiform script in Iran (serving as alphabet for both, Pahlavi and Middle Persian), before becoming World History's second international language (spoken between the Atlantic and China), as well as the writing system that impacted the formation of more alphabetic writings than any other before the modern colonial times and the deceitful and brutal imposition of Latin across different continents.
As a multilingual and multicultural, universal-ecumenical empire, Achaemenid Iran fostered translation practices and centers as a critically necessary tool for the imperial administration and for the commercial and cultural exchanges that Darius I the Great ambitiously envisioned and greatly facilitated thanks to
i- the creation of the royal road,
ii- the establishment of the imperial communication system across the vast empire,
iii- the exploration of alternative routes, and
iv- the interconnection of earlier local commercial networks into a new complex yet versatile structure that we now call "silk, spice and frankincense trade routes across lands, deserts and seas".
In a divided world, kings need translators; in a unified world, translations are necessary to merchants, mystics and the early missionaries, i.e. the Mithraic Magi.
And this is how the early Gnostics emerged; opposing the infiltration of the priests of Mithra in the western provinces, Zoroastrian scientists and mystics moved to and settled in the various parts of the empire, notably Mesopotamia and Egypt. There, they created their schools of cultural exploration and transcendental amalgamation, trying to
a) find the terms and forms of local spirituality and wisdom that corresponded to their own Iranian notions and patterns,
b) establish an accurate concordance among the diverse local terms and patterns,
c) connect the dots among the Iranian, Babylonian, Phoenician, Egyptian and Anatolian traditions and systems of world conceptualization, and
d) amalgamate properly the partly, local systems into a universal transcendental system of knowledge, science and faith.
Behind every early Gnostic and within every Gnostic Order (or school), there were always many multi-linguals and there was a lot of translation work being executed.
Fabricated as an absurd and delusional notion, "Ancient Greece" was never a territory for translations, although many different peoples inhabited the lands around the Anatolian Sea (also known as Aegean Sea); there were no scriptoria in the tiny states, petty cities, and profane communities that developed there as periphery of the Oriental world. We do not have bilingual texts, such as Assyrian-Babylonian and Linear B, Hittite Cuneiform and Linear A, Macedonian and Phoenician or Ionian and Egyptian Hieroglyphic.
Then came a cardinal event of World History of foremost magnitude; this is falsely called the 'conquests of Alexander the Great'. The correct term is: the Macedonian-Ionian Exodus to the Orient. In fact, Balkan nations sought salvation, wisdom and identity, returning to the East.
The majestic effort undertaken by the Macedonian king Alexander the Great and the 'Diadochi' consisted indeed in the adoption of Oriental concepts, world views, life styles, mentalities, attitudes, and practices in a great many manners, translation and archiving included. Without having already been Orientalized neither the Ptolemies nor the Seleucids would have turned their respective capitals, namely Alexandria and Antioch, into laborious translation centers.
The present article is not a concise History of the Translation Centers; the above points were made only to demonstrate how unrelated to translation activities all those fallaciously labeled 'Ancient Greeks' were throughout ages. Whereas multiple centers of learning and translation were developed and functioned permanently in the Asiatic and African parts of the Orient, nothing similar took place in unimportant locations such as Thebes, Corinth, Argos, Sparta, Athens, Eleusis, Chalcis, Eretria and the like.
Following the formation of the Alexandrine Koine, a Macedonian-Ionian linguistic idiom that soon became one of the palatial languages used by the Ptolemies (next to Egyptian Hieroglyphic and Demotic), a great number of Oriental texts were fully or partly translated into that, simple in syntax, vernacular in order to become accessible to Ionians, Macedonians, Thracians, Illyrians, Phrygians, Lydians, Carians, and the other populaces of the Anatolian West and the Balkan South. In total contrast to the historical truth, the modern Western colonial propaganda is deliberately focalized on the Septuagint in order to aptly support the fallacious eschatological doctrines of the pseudo-Christian heretics and heinous fools, who identify themselves as Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, Baptists, Evangelicals, Zionist Christians, and other sectarians.
As a matter of fact, many splendid masterpieces of Oriental wisdom, transcendental knowledge, science, literature, moral and spirituality were indeed translated into the Alexandrine Koine. The famous Library of Alexandria was not a "Greek" endeavor, but an Oriental undertaking. Masterpieces of Egyptian, Phoenician, Carthaginian, Hebrew, Babylonian, Iranian and other literatures and sciences were translated into Alexandrine Koine. Not Hesiod's epics! Not Aeschylus' plays! Not Plato's dialogues! Not Herodotus' pseudo-histories! Not Demosthenes' speeches! Not Aristotle's errors!
The Ancient Egyptians did not need to read the miserable details of Thucydides on a calamitous war between two unimportant cities in an uncivilized land where vicious genocides like the Melian Shame used to be customarily performed. In any case, if we have to consider all the improbabilities of World History, we can safely claim that, even if an absurd case of translation -namely that of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War into Egyptian- was to be undertaken, the Old Attic text would never be translated into Hieroglyphic but into Demotic. This would be due to the fact that the main Egyptian writing was piously revered and definitely considered as mdw-nṯr (medu netjer), i.e. literally "God's words"; consequently, no profane texts, such as Thucydides' shameless report, could possibly be written in that sacred script.
With the rise of the widely diverse early Christian sects and factions, following the formation of the official Christian dogma, and due to the advent of the First Council of Nicaea (325 CE), many among the Aramaean, Palestinian, Egyptian (Coptic), Caucasian (Armenian, Georgian), Anatolian (Cappadocian, Ionian, Pontic, etc.), African (Carthaginian; Numidian or Mauretanian Berber) and Balkan (Macedonian, Illyrian, Thracian, etc.), Roman, and other Western European Apostolic Fathers, Church Fathers, Christian Gnostics or related heresiarchs wrote treatises to spread, explain and propagate their views on the matter in several different languages.
Many among them intended -very correctly- to terminate the long tradition of philosophical schools that still thrived in the Balkan provinces of the Roman Empire south of Macedonia and Illyria; for this reason, they wrote either in Alexandrine Koine or in the Attic dialect, extensively discussing, criticizing and/or refuting ancient philosophers of Athens or other cities.
Their attitude and work were then undertaken by Aramaeans -Jacobites (also known as Miaphysites or Monophysites) and Nestorians- notably because it was crucial for them to identify devious elements in the texts of ancient philosophers as potential reasons for the theological errors of the Constantinopolitan and Roman theologians and hierarchs. Apparently there was neither a genuine interest in those idolatrous, immoral, superfluous, and verbose philosophers nor a positive evaluation of their contents; and this is proven because the contents of the translated texts, which were necessary for Aramaean priests, monks and theologians to know, were not divulged to the average people, as they were deemed absolutely vulgar, impious, and even blasphemous.
This tradition of translations was later transferred within the context of the Islamic world. Translations into Arabic were indeed effectuated from Syriac Aramaic, Middle Persian, Pahlavi, Sogdian, Coptic, Hebrew, Sanskrit, Alexandrine Koine, Eastern Roman (the language of the Constantinopolitan elite, i.e. an idiom that involved many Latin terms), Armenian, Georgian, Ge'ez, and other languages. It has to be also added that, as it had happened with the translations of texts of several Ionian or Attic philosophers into Syriac Aramaic, the contents were not disclosed to the local society, because they were considered as improper. That is why speaking of a "Greco-Arabic translation movement" is either extreme ignorance or odious bias; in either case, it ends in historical distortion and deliberate forgery.
3. The destruction of Baghdad (1258) as supposedly ruinous for the Islamic world
A vital academic myth, when it comes to the fabrication of the distorted account of Islamic History, concerns the fall of the Abbasid capital to Hulagu, the thunderous exterminator of the Assassins (Hashashin/Arabic: حَشّاشِین), the Nizari Isma'ili Order (founded in 1090 by Hasan al Sabbah) whose impregnable headquarters in Elburz Mountains constituted a separate state - enclave within the Caliphate. Few Muslims or Westerners know that, before capturing Baghdad, Hulagu (1217-1265; son of Tolui, Genghis Khan's youngest son) took the legendary castle (1256).
Even fewer people worldwide know that the great Muslim erudite scholar, scientist, mystic, geomancer, alchemist, and astronomer, who guided the Mongol Emperor to his formidable success in the unreachable stronghold Kale-ye Alamut (200 km NW of Tehran; قلعه الموت), led him also to the Mesopotamian plains and the fabulous center of the Islamic world; he was Nasir-el din al Tusi (1201-1274; نصیر الدین طوسی).
To get rid of the deliberately withheld knowledge and the shamelessly propagated ignorance, we have to admit that the phenomenal event did not constitute at all an unprecedented loss in terms of archives, libraries, schools, manuscripts, historical documentation, art collections, and scientific instruments (contrarily to what many Western pseudo-scholars and uneducated Muslim politicians shamelessly pretend), because the then world's leading sage and outstanding savant, who served as adviser to the Mongol Emperor and led the negotiations with the last Abbasid caliph prior to Baghdad's capture, was allowed to take every single manuscript, instrument or item that he deemed worthwhile; this enormous and unequalled academic wealth was duly transported and effectively utilized in Maragheh (NW Iran, east of Urmia Lake, ca. 130 km south of Tabriz).
More importantly, soon afterwards, Nasir-el din al Tusi was fully supported by Hulagu to build the then world's most advanced and best equipped observatory in Maragheh (رصدخانه مراغه / resat-khaneh Maragheh), where one can visit still today the different remains of the exceptional research center, involving a circular central tower, which was the main edifice, various adjacent structures, a workshop, a school, a library, and the palace. Erudite scholars and illustrious scientists from China, the Eastern Roman Empire, as well as from Muslim lands, such as Andalusia, Maghreb, India, Egypt, Syria, and Seljuk Anatolia moved to Iran and worked for years in the renowned observatory, which remains intentionally unknown to most people across the Earth.
In terms of historical continuity of the Islamic scholarly research and erudition, Maragheh stands between Abbasid Baghdad and Timurid Samarqand.
Before I briefly describe the historical evolution, which led to the demise of the Abbasid Caliphate, and I shed light on the reasons that make of it an event of secondary importance, I have however to explain in what it is necessary today to desperately portray the fall of Baghdad (1258) as disastrous for the Islamic world. This lie serves the purposes of both, the academic forgers of the Western world and the ignorant scholars of the Muslim world, who pathetically and ridiculously repeat the lies that their Western masters teach them.
Deceitful colonial scholars, by misinterpreting the fall of the Abbasid capital, drive a wedge between Muslims and Turkic (or Turanian) nations, and put the blame for the supposedly catastrophic event on the latter. This is totally nonsensical because many Turkic people had already adhered to Islam and a great number of Muslims wished, prayed, and rejoiced for the destruction of the Abbasid shame.
Even worse, by so doing, the biased Western Orientalists place themselves on a long established line of wicked, sectarian and disreputable Islamic historiography, which through the Ilkhanid (1256-1335) and the Ottoman (1299-1922) times reproduced the evilness of the early foes of Islam and justified all the crimes of the pseudo-Muslim caliphs, who reigned illegally against the designated successor Ali ibn Abi Taleb's family, their supporters, and the outright majority of the Muslim populations, rudely accumulating worthless tons of nonsensical jurisprudence and absurdly developed theological doctrines. This malignant literature turned Islam from a religious dogma fully empowering humans in their spiritual path into nonsensical codes of behavioral rigidity, faithless rationalism, and petty processes (taqlid, ijtihad, ijma, etc.) adjusted to the material interests of criminal rulers.
The bulk of this burdensome literature was duly burned and effectively destroyed in 1258 in order to save the Muslims from the pathetic class of jurisprudential experts (i.e: fuqaha, which is the plural of 'faqih', the 'jurist'). All the same, few Abbasid theologians and jurists survived, resettled elsewhere, notably in Damascus and Cairo, gathered similar material from other Islamic centers, and reproduced the same wicked literature as they intended to continue their sectarian and devilish manners. Almost 150 years later, the terrible siege and the destruction of Damascus (1400), undertaken by 'Emir' Timur (Tamerlane; 1336-1405, ruled after 1370), the Islamic world's greatest conqueror and emperor, was concluded with the extermination of almost all the remnants of those evil jurists and the destruction of their nonsensical and pseudo-Islamic documentation. Few survivors made their way to Edirne, the then Ottoman capital, and impacted disastrously the already perverse Ottoman theological clique.
This line of historiography, theology, jurisprudence and rule comes down to our days in the colonially prepared and adapted forms of Political Islam, Wahhabism, Pan-Arabism, and Islamic terrorism. This dark side of Islamic governance would have been entirely and irreversibly terminated, if the colonial powers of the West had not intentionally decided to strengthen it and subsequently utilize it; it was actually deracinated and banned in Kemal Ataturk's Turkey and in the USSR due to the then flourished (since the last decades of czarist rule) Jadidist movement.
Ignorant scholars, uneducated theologians, and illiterate dictators of today's Muslim world, by also misinterpreting the fall of the Abbasid capital, cultivate and spread the psychologically disastrous concept of the "Islamic world being under assault"; the deceitful notion turns immediately many Muslims to direct activism and it all ends with extremism and Islamic terrorism, as it brings to their minds the equally false story of the so-called 'Arab Conquests'. It may be true that Dar al-Islam (the House of Islam) has been under unprecedented aggression and sophisticated attack over the past 500 years, but this fact -quite contrarily to the aforementioned reaction- had to lead Muslims to
- in-depth exploration, proper understanding, and overwhelming rejection of the Western world, i.e. an endeavor of great magnitude provenly based on analysis of principles, concepts and categories (instead of fast, superficial and silly denunciation that ends up in servile acceptance);
- extensive study, truthful examination, and effective re-acquisition of the Islamic spiritual, intellectual, academic, and scientific heritage, which has been absolutely lost for them (because they did not bother to study it for centuries, shamelessly selling scores of Islamic manuscripts to Western antiquaries); and
- self-inquisitive stance, self-corrective action, and repentance.
Trying to solve problems externally, when the origin of the problems remains active internally, ends up always in total failure and annihilation; in similar cases, all the external wrongdoers are not the true enemies, because all those, who fail to stand their ground, had to first, realize that the problem existed already inside them and second, overwhelmingly change as per the needs of each circumstance.
The Mongol destruction of Baghdad (1258) is not an end – in any sense. In the middle of the 13th c., the Abbasid Caliphate was a comical relic that did not resemble at all the formidable empire of Harun al Rashid. The 5-century long history of the dynasty involves one century of phenomenal rise and unique greatness and four centuries of administrative disorderliness, military powerlessness, dynastic meaninglessness, and state fragmentation. One must not be taken by surprise! As a matter of fact, these were the most glorious and outstanding years of Islamic civilization, because the society was entirely secular; in contrast, the Abbasid state was totally useless, inoperable and purposeless, as it was constituted by few courtiers and idiotic sheikhs issuing pathetic fatwas that were never enforced.
I have to admit that this fact is almost impossible for modern Western scholars and intellectuals to comprehend; this is so because they are accustomed to associate the rise in terms of arts, letters, sciences, spirituality, intellect, and culture with a strong state and successful governance. There was never in Western Europe a possibility to effectuate spiritual, scholarly, intellectual, artistic and cultural achievements without a decisive role played by the rulers and the government. This has much to do with the inherent trait and the evident nature of Christianity as a state religion. However, Islam is at the very antipodes of that phenomenon, because there is absolutely no hierarchical structure in the community of the faithful, neither should there be any.
Whenever state and religion were mixed in the History of the Islamic World, vicious and monstrous tyrannies, abysmal ignorance, detrimental lack of education, and absence of science were manifested to characterize the misfortunate lives of the believers.
What happened to Abbasid Baghdad with the rise of the Barmakids and the establishment of Bayt al Hikmah is simple to describe; realizing the need for an elaborate imperial structure, involving scientific, scholarly, artistic and intellectual development, the unsophisticated tribal leaders of marginal Hejaz, who had settled in Mesopotamia, proved to be unable to cope with the formidable force of the Iranian civilization that they decided to accept and foster.
When you fail to contain and control the force that you dare to unleash or even employ, it will inevitably dominate you fully sooner or later.
Behind the Sassanids stood an almost 1-millennium long Iranian imperial tradition, which they had perfectly captivated, comprehended, and assessed; they were one with it.
Behind the Achaemenids stood a 2-millennium long imperial Akkadian, Assyrian, Babylonian tradition that the early Iranians had apprehended, incorporated, and operated, thanks to the groundbreaking mission of Zoroaster; Achaemenid Iran functioned as an extension of the old Mesopotamian world, thus making of Modern Iran the only land of 6-millennium long cultural continuity in the world.
But behind the Abbasids and their form of understanding Prophet Muhammad's preaching stood nothing. Not even a minor royal tradition like those we attest in Pre-Islamic Yemen or the Horn of Africa region. Even worse for the Abbasids, with the only exception of Harun al Rashid, they failed to potentially transform and function as Neo-Sassanids and thus take their fate into their own hands.
It was therefore natural for the Abbasids to be totally overwhelmed by the influx of Iranian wisdom, expertise, knowledge, intellect, and culture; they proved able to cope with the developments and withstand the situation for about 5-7 decades, but after the middle of the 9th c., they were irrevocably reduced to impotence, inertia, and nothingness.
Having failed to establish a strong basis of support among the Aramaeans, the Iranians, and the Egyptians, who were the strongest ethnic groups of the empire, having been unable to set up new effective and functional, provincial administrative units directly and fully controlled by the imperial administration in the capital, and having totally disregarded the urgent need for operational and successful military command, iron discipline, and army values (instead of filthy tribal nonsense and theological rubbish), the Abbasids simply could not keep their vast territory united under their scepter.
When all dimensions of Iranian culture were able to be expressed again in fully unrestrained manner,
- secessionist dynasties emerged,
- regional rulers became the de facto kings of the Caliphate's different provinces, which turned out to be real, independent kingdoms only nominally attached to the Caliphate, and
- Turanian soldiers with a handful of combatants started visiting the apparently impotent caliph at Baghdad to demand the favor to rule in his name this or that province and send him taxes. As the caliph was becoming weaker on daily basis, he was apparently forced to accept the infamous proposals only to become even weaker afterwards.
The Islamic Caliphate was clinically defunct around the middle of the 9th c. No one needed the year 1258 to come so that they understand that the Caliphate was no more. That is why the foolish Ottoman attempt to revive the institution (1517) was a stillborn; it only heralded and precipitated the fall of the Sultan at Constantinople
C. The inevitable return of Iran and Turan: the Iranianates and the Iranian-Turanian 'Intermezzo'
The name currently used to describe the multitude of regional states, governed by Iranian and Turanian dynasties on behalf of the impotent caliph at Baghdad and markedly characterized by Iranian culture, is "Persianate". Introduced by Marshall Hodgson (1922-1968), the term is a variant of another word also coined by him, namely "Islamicate". The accent is evidently put on culture, not on religion; all the same, the term is quite questionable.
First, if "Islamic" refers directly to the religion of Islam, while "Islamicate" denotes the broader cultural, social, and aesthetic traditions associated with Muslims, then we absurdly tend to justify modern uneducated radicals and extremists, namely all those who present their newly concocted ideology as supposedly pertaining to "Islam". We cannot afford to take the nonsensical standards of today's Islamists as the correct method to study the History of the Islamic world. In most of those historical states, neither theology nor Sharia (jurisprudence) played an important role; in addition, these words had a totally different meaning than what is believed nowadays. The notions that are currently attributed to these terms by today's ignorant Muslims would be rather viewed as serious misunderstanding and disastrous mistake typical of poorly educated men, back at the time of the Golden Age of Islam. Consequently, the states that some modern scholars may call "Islamicate" are the true historical "Islamic" states, as they prevailed throughout History and not as they are mistakenly imagined by modern uneducated and ignorant rascals who happen to think that they are 'Muslims' whereas they are nothing.
Second, the term "Persianate" evokes the culture of Fars (Persia), i.e. only one of the provinces of Iran, whereas the cultural context within which the seceded kingdoms flourished was equally and fully Iranian and Turanian. Without Turkic combatants from parts of Central Asia, Mongolia and Siberia, without heroism and epic battles, and without a gallant literary tradition of legendary champions endlessly fighting for universal-imperial values and principles (and not for the implementation of silly tribal 'laws' and pathetic fatwas), most of all these states would have never been established. The term "Iranianate" is therefore far more appropriate.
The real comeback of Iran was neither the impact of the Barmakids on the Abbasid state nor the activities carried out in the Bayt al Hikmah; it mainly consisted in the formation of numerous seceded kingdoms, the astounding influx of Iranian and Turanian traditions and cultural values, and the meteoric rise and prevalence of Iranian spiritual, intellectual, scientific, palatial and administrative norms, notions, and examples. At the end of all this, at the very beginning of the 11th c., we attest the greatest conceptualization of Man in the History of Mankind: Ferdowsi's Shahnameh.
One can list up to ca. 100 kingdoms, principalities, emirates, sultanates, khanates, sizeable tribal confederations or empires, which could be called "Iranianates" and which span from the 2nd c. of the Islamic Era (9th c. CE) to the early 20th c. It has to be specified that the phenomenon concerns basically Asia and Eastern Europe; in the Western parts of Asia, the prevailing common terms for those states were "Emirate" and "Khanate", whereas in the central and southern parts of the continent, the states were mostly named "Sultanate" or "Khanate". Which historical states are and which are not included in the related lists is a still disputed and debatable topic. Some of those entities were short-lived, whereas other lasted for several centuries.
However, all the major Islamic empires of the 16th-19th c., which were absurdly and derogatorily baptized by colonial historiographers "gunpowder empires", namely the Mughal Empire of Hindustan, Safavid (and later Afshar and Qajar) Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, were undeniably and genuinely "Iranianates".
The modern nationalist misinterpretation of the Ottoman Empire as a "Turkic" state is, in the light of the historical sources and the existing evidence, an absurdity. It is a criminal falsehood to attribute the concept or notion of "Turkishness" to the state of the Constantinopolitan sultans.
This irrevocable historical reality is intentionally concealed nowadays: the most important trait of many among those states was their secular and tolerant nature; they were mostly multilingual and multi-religious lands where Arabic was the language of science, administration and religion, Farsi was the language of culture, literature, and spirituality, and Turkic languages were the means of communication for the army and the palace.
If once upon a time in World History kings were astronomers, scientists, mystics, wise savants (: 'philosophers') and/or poets, this occurred precisely and massively in the period of Islamic History from the middle of the 7th c. CE to the middle of the 15th c.; at this point, I have to stress the fact that it did not happen because these emirs, khans or sultans were hypothetically influenced by Plato, but because the Golden Era of Islam invigorated the most cardinal traits of the Oriental monarchy and of the imperial universalism-ecumenism that the Athenian philosopher observed in Egypt and heard about Iran, Babylonia and Assyria.
The fact that the rise of many among those states was meteoric and the fall came rather soon (i.e. in less than one century) produced a real phenomenon of moving sands; the borders were changing constantly and when we draw a map, we have to clearly state the specific date, because the same emirate may have controlled larger or smaller lands few decades earlier or later. It is noteworthy that this change did not involve much bloodshed; it was a clash between few hundreds or thousands of guards fighting in support of dynasties, not populations.
1. The instantaneous rise of secessionist states that preserved Iranian culture
The rise of the Iranianates should not be confused with
a- few pre-Islamic Iranian states or enclaves that persisted from the first day after the terminal fall of the Sassanid Empire (651 CE); among them we count the following:
i- Having been a Sassanid satrapy (260-479 CE) and having been conquered by the (descendants of the Xiongnu) White Huns (also known as Hephthalites) in 479 CE and later by the First Turkic Khaganate in 557 CE, Sogdia or Sogdiana (Sughd) became part of the Western Turkic Khaganate, before being conquered by the Umayyad and the Abbasid armies. However, parts of Sogdian land remained independent; located in Transoxiana (Mawarannahr), the Ushrusana Afshinate ('princedom'; 'Afshin' being an Eastern Iranian term for 'noble ruler') lasted from ca. 600 CE until almost the end of the 9th c., in spite of the Umayyad conquest of Transoxiana (673-751); it was incorporated in the Samanid Iranianate (in 892).
ii- the Bukhar Khudahs (Xwaday), i.e. the 'Lords of Bukhara', were Sogdian rulers of Bukhara, who became independent from the Western Turkic Khaganate (581-742) sometime after the Battle of Gol-Zarriun (563), when the Sassanids and the Göktürks put an end to the White Hun rule. Mazdaean of religion and Iranian of culture, the Bukhar Khudahs resisted both, the Umayyad and the Abbasid armies, being safely headquartered in their capital Varakhsha, the incredible treasures of which are now publicly exposed in the Museum of Arts of Uzbekistan and in Hermitage Museum (Petersburg). The Bukharan Princedom was also annexed by the Samanid Iranianate.
iii- the Chaghan Khudahs, the 'Lords of Chaghaniyan', became independent from the White Huns and opposed fiercely the Umayyad and Abbasid armies, being centered around their capital on the right bank of Amu Darya (Oxus) River, south of Samarqand. In the beginning of the 9th c. they became part of the Caliphate.
iv- the Ferghana kingdom was a Sogdian state that was formed after a) the defeat of the Western Turkic Khaganate (in 657) by the armies of Tang China (618-907 CE), b) the establishment of a local protectorate, c) the Umayyad invasion led by Qutayba ibn Muslim in 715, and d) the Sogdian revolution of 720-722 under Divashtich, who could trace his ancestry back to the illustrious Sassanid Emperor Bahram V Gur (420-438). He was betrayed and finally defeated, but next year Suluk, the Turanian Khagan of the Türgesh confederation, sided firmly with the Sogdians of Ferghana, definitely crushed the Umayyad army, and ensured one century of independence for Ferghana, which was also included in the Samanid Iranianate (in 819).
v- the Princedom of Khuttal (or Khotlan), in the Khatlon (Хатлон) region of today's SW Tajikistan, became independent from the White Hums in the early 7th c. and repeatedly resisted the Islamic armies from 676 until 750, although the local rulers at times had to acknowledge the Umayyad authority.
vi- the Qarinvand dynasty ruled Tabaristan (also known as Mazandaran, i.e. the mountainous region formed by the northern precipices of the Elburz mountain ridge that corresponds to the southern coastlands of the Caspian Sea) from the middle of the 6th c. until the 11th c.; founded by Karen, an army chief of Khusraw I, they interacted with other local dynasties in order to effectively reject Islamic rule, at times ruling the entire coast land, at times being reduced to the most inaccessible valleys of the Elburz Mountains.
vii- the Dabuyid dynasty, established as Principality by Gil Gavbara, ruled the eastern parts of Tabaristan and sometimes parts of western Khorasan from 642 to 760, being acknowledged as descendants of Jamasp, son of the Sassanid Emperor Peroz I.
viii- the Baduspanids set up an Princedom in the western parts of Tabaristan that lasted from 665 until 1598 when it was incorporated into the Safavid Empire of Iran. They were closely associated with the Dabuyids, because Baduspan I was one of the sons of Gil Gavbara.
ix- the Zarmihrids controlled another part of Tabaristan from the middle of the 6th c. until 785 when they were defeated by the Abbasid army. They were the descendants of Sukhra who belonged to the noble Sassanid House of Karen (Karen Pahlav or the Karenids), one of the seven noble great houses of the Sassanid Empire.
x- the Bavandids constituted another Iranian dynasty (an offspring of the House of Ispahbudhan, another major Sassanid noble house) that managed to rule parts of Tabaristan from 651 until 1349 , when Kiya Afrasiab of the Chalavi dynasty (that also had Bavandid roots) killed the last Bavandid ruler, Hassan II (Fakhr al-Dawla).
b- several early seceded states that were established by various sectarian leaders of Arab origin, who offered a different interpretation of both, Prophet Muhammad's revelation and Ali's preaching and/or practice, and fought against Ali ibn Abi Taleb himself and his family, as well as the illegal pretenders to the otherwise islamically unsolicited Caliphate. Most notorious among them were the Kharijites, who were also divided among themselves, as the Azariqa group was headquartered in Fars and Kerman (southern Iran) and the Najdat faction prevailed across the deserts of Yamama, in the central-eastern parts of the Arabian Peninsula.
c- Muslim states established following the various attempts undertaken by Ali ibn Abi Taleb and his family, i.e. the offspring of Prophet Muhammad, to overthrow the viciously anti-Islamic, immoral, illegal, and criminal rule of the various groups of pseudo-Muslims, who opposed the designation of the prophet's cousin and son-in law as first caliph and imam. Known as the Alids or the Zaydids, they too formed a state, which -located in northern Iran- also challenged the Umayyad and the Abbasid authority.
2. The revolutions that paved the way for the rise of the Iranianates
Vast as they may have been, both early caliphates were hollow indeed, and they were meant never to ascertain their rule; their disability was evidently innate. With the exception of the territories west of Euphrates in Anatolia and in Syro-Palestine and the lands conquered in North Africa (which had been Iranian for rather not very long periods), the early caliphates occupied mainly the central homeland of Iran. When some Iranians realized the truth that existed in Islam (as preached by the Alids) and the falsehood presented as Islam by lawless claimants, the Iranization of Islam became an easy affair.
As a matter of fact, an impressive number of rebellions started taking place only few decades after the completion of the Islamic conquest of Iran; but they do not appear to be Mazdaean of nature stricto sensu. Apparently, the imperial appearance of the Sassanid cult had gone. However, the legendary traditions, the fundamental moral principles, the folkloric heritage, and the overall cultural environment were ardently reinvigorated in the preaching and the admonitions of all those Iranian spiritual visionaries and courageous dissenters, who seem to have also had great sympathy and broad understanding for the cause of Ali ibn Abi Taleb and his family. These mystics and their passionate discourses we have to consider as the true foundations of the diverse and numerous Iranianates.
From Behafarid (Middle Persian: Weh-afrid, Farsi: بهآفرید), who led an Iranian peasant revolt but was defeated by Abu Muslim Khorasani in the late 740s, …
From Al-Harith ibn Surayj, who -although Arab (from the Tamim tribe)- stoke an alliance with local Iranians, Khurasani Yemenite settlers, and Turanians of Eastern Iran (notably Suluk, the Türgesh khagan of Transoxiana) and launched a series of rebellions of agrarian and religious (Murji'ah; the 'procrastinators') nature between 729 and 746 …
From Abu Muslim Khorasani (718-755), an Iranian who initiated the anti-Umayyad revolt of the Abbasids, contributed greatly to the victory (defeating the Umayyad governor of Merv), vanquished Behafarid, but was soon considered as a potential Crypto-Mazdaean, viewed as a threat by the new dynasty, and assassinated, …
From Sunpadh (an offspring of the Sassanid House of Karen, which withdrew in Tabaristan after the battle of Neyshapur in 652), who revolted in order to revenge the assassination of Abu Muslim Khorasani, garnered great support from Tabaristan and the Zagros Mountains, conquered numerous cities, but was later defeated (755), only to be posthumously praised by a great many Muslim historians (notably Tabari, al-Mas'udi, and even Nizam al-Mulk) as a great mystic and a savant able to formulate a religious faith and a doctrine reconciling Mazdeism, Mazdakism, and Islam (as preached by the family of Ali ibn Abi Taleb), …
From Ishaq al-Turk (a Turanian from Transoxiana), who seems to have also claimed descent from Yahya ibn Zayd (725-743; the oldest son of Zayd ibn Ali who was the founder of the Zaydi movement), became the leader of the al-Muslimiyyah after the death of Abu Muslim Khorasani, and declared an insurgence against the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur in the 760s and the 770s, only to have been finally defeated and executed, …
From Ustadh Sis, who reinvigorated the Bihafaridi (or Behafaridian) movement in the late 760s and won several battles against the Abbasid armies, before being captured and executed, …
… to Al-Muqanna, a most comprehensive, groundbreaking, and enchanting reassessment of the Iranian heritage took place and, large enough to encompass the revelation of prophet Muhammad and the preaching of Ali ibn Abi Taleb, it re-established the Iranian identity, cultural integrity, and imperial reality on an entirely new trajectory that only corroborated Iran's central position in the History of Mankind.
So, only 150 years after the terminal defeat of Yazdegerd III, we bear witness to the stupendous conceptualization of Al Muqanna, as well as to the heroic efforts of his disciples, namely Abu Imran, Javidhan ibn Sahl, the illustrious combatant Babak Khorramdin (national hero of Azerbaijan) and his rebels, who -effectively based in their impregnable castle (Kale-ye Babak) near Kaleybar (in the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan)- challenged the caliphs for almost 30 years in the early 9th c. (807-837). It was only after many campaigns, major battles, unprecedented bloodshed, and incredible monstrosities that the great hero and master of the Khurramites found a martyr's death and their fortress fell in the hands of the Abbasid armies. However, for the ill-fated Caliphate, it was already too late.
These events occurred at a time when
- the Barmakids had already become influential in Baghdad;
- the Bayt al Hikmah had been established and was fully fledged; and
- the Alids continued being persecuted by the Abbasids with almost the same ferocity as at the time of the Umayyads, as Ja'far al-Sadiq (6th Imam) and Musa al-Kazim (7th Imam) had died (respectively in 765 and 799), whereas Ali al-Rida (8th Imam; 766-818) was summoned by the Abbasid caliph al Ma'mun, who ruled from 813 to 833, to Merv (in Khorasan, today's Eastern Turkmenistan) to be proclaimed as the heir apparent, an event that caused radical divisions and extreme tension with the already unstable and misgoverned caliphate.
It was clear that the Zaydi movement would sooner or later establish local dynasties in different regions, notably the Iranian North, and the Justanids (791-11th c.) were only the first to be formed in the mountainous region of Daylam. Even courtiers and commanders, who were totally unrelated to the family of Ali ibn Ab Taleb, like Abu Dulaf al-Ijli, were able to acquire enough power to secede and launch their own dynasties; the Dulafids were headquartered in Central Iran (Karaj) and during the 9th c. (800-898), they functioned as an independent enclave within the collapsing Caliphate. Last but not the least, the Alawite (Alid) Emirate was headquartered in Amol (Tabaristan) and, from 864 until 928, it coexisted with all the other locally based secessionist states.
It was then that the Iranianates (wrongly called Persianates) appeared in force; for seven (7) centuries, they entirely transformed the lives of the people, bringing art, science, spirituality, and wisdom at the epicenter of the local societies, demonstrating minimal concern for the theological absurdities that impotent and marginal sheikhs and muftis intended to diffuse. Islam remained the preponderant religion across all lands between China and Egypt, but it was Iranian culture that determined the historical evolution. The essence of these states was basically secular.
The Samanid Emirate (819–999) in NE Iran, the Kara-Khanid Khanate (840–1212) in Central Asia, the Saffarid Emirate (861–1003) in most of today's Iran's territory, the Sajid Emirate (889–929) and the Sallarid Emirate (919–1062) in the Caucasus region, the Ziyarid Emirate (931–1090) in Central Iran, the Ilyasid Emirate (932–968) in SE Iran, the Shaddadid Emirates (951–1199) in Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus region, the Ravadid Emirate (955–1070/1116) in Azerbaijan, the Kakuyid Emirate (1008–1141) in N-NW Iran, the Ghaznavid Sultanate (977–1186) and the Ghurid Sultanate (1011–1215) in the area of today's Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and NW India, the Seljuk Sultanate (1037–1194) in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Anatolia, and Central Asia, the Rum Sultanate (1077–1308) in Anatolia, the Khwarazmian Empire (1077–1231) in Iran and Central Asia, and the Delhi Sultanate (1207–1526) that controlled most of the lands of today's Pakistan and Northern-Central India were the driving force of civilization between the Eastern Roman Empire and China.
However, historically more important than all of them were the Buyid Emirates (934–1062) because they were the first to also take power in Baghdad, thus truly overlapping with the Abbasid Caliphate and thus forcing it to become its penumbra.
One of the earliest Iranianates was the Samanid Empire, the latest echo of which is the use of the royal name for the currency of Tajikistan. Launched in the year 2000 in order to replace the Russian ruble, the Somoni was named after Ismail Samani (849-907), the founder of the illustrious Iranianate dynasty.
These critical facts of the Iranian and the World History should have been the focus of the education, the culture, and the governance in Iran under any modern regime, be it pseudo-royal (Pahlavi) or bogus-religious (Ayatollahs). For more than one century after the fall (1925) of the last truly Iranian imperial dynasty (Qajar), Iran underwent an undeserved policy of self-effacement and accommodation with the diverse colonial interests (US or European / UK) that the said two regimes scrupulously and shamefully served.
(to be continued)
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